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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CLOSING THE
SCHOOLHOUSE GATE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988)
Respondents, former staff members of a high school newspaper
published in a journalism class, alleged a violation of their first amendment rights when the school principal deleted two pages of the paper.'
The pages contained articles describing students' experiences with
pregnancy and the impact of divorce on students at the school.2 Although the pages contained other, unobjectionable material, the principal withheld both pages from publication. Respondents filed suit in4
federal district court against the school district and school officials.
The district court found that editing the school paper was within the
school officials' discretion and did not violate the students' first amendment rights. 5 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,6 noting
that the school paper was a public forum, "intended to be and operated
as a conduit for the student viewpoint. '7 On certiorari,8 the Supreme
Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, and HELD, since the school paper
is not a public forum, 9 school authorities may exercise editorial control
over the style and content of student speech so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 10

1. 108 S. Ct. 562, 566 (1988).
2. Id. at 565-66. The principal objected to the pregnancy story because the pregnant students, though not named, could be identified and because the article's references to sexual
activity and birth control were inappropriate for some students. The principal objected to the
divorce article because the proofs had identified by name (though the name was deleted in the
final version) a student who complained of her father's conduct, and the parents had not been
given an opportunity to respond. Id.
3. Id. at 566 n.1. Believing there was not enough time to make the changes in the paper
and have it ready for publication, the principal directed that the pages on which the articles
appeared be withheld. Id. at 566.
4. 607 F. Supp. 1450 (D.C. Mo. 1985), rev'd, 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S.
Ct. 562 (1988).
5. 607 F. Supp. at 1467.
6. 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
7. 795 F.2d at 1372.
8. 108 S. Ct. 562, 567 (1988).
9. Id. at 568.
10. Id. at 571.
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The Supreme Court has denied states the power to abridge the
fundamental rights explicitly and implicitly stated in the Bill of Rights
absent a compelling state interest.', The government, however, bears
no affirmative duty to guarantee the meaningful exercise of those
rights.12 While the government may not impede or restrain an individual's right to free expression, 13 government property is not automatically a forum for the exposition of one's ideas.14 The government, like
a private land owner, exercises absolute discretion over the use of
property held in public trust. 5
The Supreme Court, however, has abridged the government's absolute proprietary right16 by protecting access to public property that
is a "quintessentially public forum.' ' 17 In streets and public squares,
which have historically served as fora for the exchange of ideas, the
right of free expression is subject only to compelling government interests.18 The Court extended the public forum concept to encompass
public buildings. 19 As long as the expression is consistent with the
government's use of the facilities, an individual's first amendment
2
rights will prevail over the government's proprietary interest. 0

11. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (first amendment is a fundamental
right protected from state action by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
12. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (while the fourteenth amendment
prohibits states from restricting the exercise of fundamental rights, neither the states nor
Congress has a duty to fund or subsidize the exercise of fundamental rights).
13. See generally Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) (government
must do more than refrain from censorship and must act affirmatively to facilitate expression).
14. See, e.g., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814
(1984) ("the mere fact that government property can be used as a vehicle of communication
does not mean that the Constitution requires such uses to be permitted").
15. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47-8 (1897).
16. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 n.6 (1969)
(dedication of a public place to specific uses does not imply that the constitutional rights of the
persons entitled to be there are gauged as if the premises were purely private property).
17. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (city could not lawfully forbid union from
communicating its ideas by holding meetings and assemblies in the open air and at public places).
The Supreme Court subsequently deemed streets and parks "quintessentially public forums."
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
18. In Hague, the Court said freedom of expression in streets and parks is subject only to
regulations concerning the general "comfort and convenience" which do not abridge or deny
freedom of speech and assembly. 307 U.S. at 515. Perry later referred to the standard originally
enumerated in Hague as a "compelling government interest" requirement. 460 U.S. at 45.
19. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555-57 (1975) (auditorium and city-leased theatre were public forums designed for and dedicated to expressive
activities). See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-8 (1981) (school meeting facilities
used for student meetings are public fora).
20. Compare Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 136-9 (1966) (silent protest of segregation
allowed in reading room of public library) with Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41-3 (1966)
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In the schools, the government not only has a valid interest in
controlling the use of public property but also has the duty to educate
its citizenry. 21 Although the government may not impose orthodoxy
in the name of education,- it has a compelling interest to maintain an
atmosphere conducive to learning. 23 These valid pedagogical and proprietary state interests must be weighed against the student's first
amendment rights.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,"
the Court attempted to define high school students' first amendment
rights. In Tinker, school authorities suspended high school students
for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. The Court
found that punishing the students for their unobtrusive protest violated
their first amendment rights. 25 The Court stated that students in school
as well as out of school are "persons" under the Constitution and
26
possess certain fundamental rights which the state must respect.
While school officials have extensive authority to run the school,- 7 they
must exercise their discretion consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards.8 The Court reasoned that students do not "shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate."-9 Only upon a showing that the forbidden expression
would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline30 or with the rights of others" 1 would the
(demonstrators at a jail not protected by first amendment because their expression was inconsistent with government use of the facility as a prison).
21. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Today education
is perhaps the most important function of state and local government.").
22. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("[N]o
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism or religion,
or other matters of opinion.").
23. See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972) (anti-noise statute narrowly tailored
to further state's compelling interest in having an undisrupted school session conducive to student
learning).
24. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
25. Id. at 508.
26. Id. at 511.
27. Id. at 507.
28. Id. at 511.
29. Id. at 506.
30. The standard of material and substantial interference is derived from Burnside v. Byars,
363 F.2d 744, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1966) (permitting students to wear "freedom buttons" where
there was no disturbance to the functioning of the school) and Blackwell v. Issaquena County
Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966) (upholding school officials' right to deny students
the right to wear "freedom buttons" where students wearing buttons harassed those who did
not and created a disturbance).
31. Where demonstrable harm to others, including emotional harm, can be shown, school
officials may repress disturbing conduct. Katz v. McAulay, 438 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir. 1971),
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Court sustain prohibition on expression.3 2 An "undifferentiated fear
or apprehension of disturbance" is not enough to overcome the right
of freedom of expression.3 The authority to decide these constitutional
issues remains with the Court.m
Tinker suggests that even in places which are not traditionally
public fora, the only permissible restrictions on expression are those
that require the expressive activity to conform to the place's use. In
Perry Educational Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,35 the Court replaced this functional, balancing approach with a
tiered public forum analysis.36 Perry involved a rival teachers' union's
right to have equal access to school mailboxes which were open to
the teachers' representative union. The Court denied the rival union's
first amendment and equal protection claims, stating that different
treatment of the two unions was not based on the content of the
expression but on the unions' different capacities.37 The Perry Court
stated that the right of access depends on the character of the property
at issue.- Although access to a quintessentially public forum is subject
only to compelling government interests and reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions,' 9 the Court described the mailbox as only a
"limited public forum. ' ' 40 While the state may allow the public to use

cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972) (prohibiting distribution of leaflets soliciting funds is permissible
upon showing demonstrable harm to students who did not contribute because they had different
beliefs or were too poor). Most lower courts accept a tort standard towards invasion of rights.
See, e.g., Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood, 795 F.2d 1368, 1376 (1986) (any standard not allowing
potential tort liability could result in school officials "crushing speech at the slightest fear of
disturbance").
32. 393 U.S. at 509 (1969).
33. Id. at 508.
34. Id. at 507.
35. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
36. "Public forum," referring to property well suited to public speech and the exchange of
ideas is discussed in Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 1. In a "tiered public forum analysis," the Court applies varying degrees of scrutiny
according to the nature of the forum. Regulation of public fora is subject to a strict scrutiny
standard, and regulation of limited-public fora is subject to a reasonableness standard. 460 U.S.
at 45-46. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985)
(government's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable; "[iun
contrast to a public forum, a finding of strict incompatibility between the nature of the speech
or the identity of the speaker and the functioning of the forum need not be made").
37. 460 U.S. at 50. Representative union's use of school mailboxes was necessary to perform
its duties as exclusive representative. The rival union, lacking such obligations, had no need of
access. Id. at 51.
38. Id. at 44.
39. Id. at 45.
40. Id. at 46-47.
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government property as a forum for expressive activity, the state
retains the right to reserve the forum for its intended purpose. 41 The
Court suggested that the state may control access to a nonpublic forum
based on the subject matter and the identity of the speaker, so long
as the distinctions are reasonably related to the purpose of the forum.42
Important to the Court's holding was the availability of alternate fora;
the rival union was not foreclosed from effectively communicating with
the teachers through other media.The Perry forum analysis, with its seemingly objective standard
for balancing the state's interests against the individual's first amendment rights, supplanted the "material and substantial interference"
standard of Tinker, which had proved difficult to define and impossible
5
to consistently apply.- In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,4
the Court looked to the nature of the forum to define the appropriate
level of scrutiny, thus resolving the first amendment claim without
regard to whether the expression disturbs the educational environment
or the rights of others. In Fraser,a student used sexual innuendo to
praise a candidate for school office in a speech addressed to a school
assembly.46 The Court held that such speech is unprotected in a school
assembly.47 The nature of the expression distinguished the case from
Tinker.8 While the speech fell short of being legally obscene, ' 9 school

41. Id. at 46.
42. Id. at 49. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content.").
43. 460 U.S. at 53 (reasonableness of limitations on access to school mail is supported by
the substantial alternative channels that remain open for teacher-union communication).
44. See generally Hamilton, Free Expression in the Public Schools: Regulation of School
Newspapers, 18 CUMB. L. REV. 181 (1988) (ambiguities of the Tinker "material and substantial
interference" standard have given rise to disparate standards in the lower courts). See also
Diamond, The First Amendment and the Court: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59
TEX. L. REV. 477, 487 (1981) ("The extraordinary lack of consistency in lower court cases
attempting to follow Tinker demonstrates the lack of real guidance provided by the Court's
decision.").
45. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
46. Id. at 678 ("Fraser referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and
explicit sexual metaphor."); cf. 478 U.S. at 687-88 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing the text of
Fraser's speech, and concluding that the remarks "exceeded permissible limits.").
47. Id. at 685.
48. Id. at 680. Note, Tinker Revisited: Fraser v. Bethel School District and the Regulation
of Speech in the Public Schools, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1164, 1165. Tinker is distinguishable as a
public forum case; Fraseris a legitimate time, manner, place restriction. Id.
49. 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) (the language used is far removed from the
narrow class of obscene speech which is not protected by the first amendment) (citing Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). The Fraser
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authorities are not bound to give the same deference to sexual innuendo at a school assembly as they must afford the unobtrusive
political expression in Tinker" Although sexual innuendo could not
be prohibited outside the school setting, students' first amendment
rights in school are not coextensive with those generally held by
adults .5 Inside school, officials have the authority to censure forms
of speech inappropriate to the forum.5
In the instant case, the Court extended the Fraser rationale to
sanction the censure of ideas and the subject matter itself.5 The Court
decided that school officials may use their discretion to reasonably
restrict content as well as the manner of expression.5 To come within
the protection of Tinker, the medium for the speech must first be a
public forum.- The instant Court defined the school newspaper as a
nonpublic forum;-" school facilities are public fora only if school authorities "have by policy or practice opened those facilities to indiscriminate use by the general public. '' 57 Because the school board did
not definitively state that the paper was open to public discourse, the
paper remained a nonpublic forum.5 The Court reasoned that since
the paper was not a public forum, school officials could regulate the
content of the paper in any reasonable manner.
The Court found the Tinker material and substantial interference
standard inapplicable 59 because the instant case did not involve the

Court referred to the speech as "lewd and obscene." Id. at 680. In the instant case, however,
the Court appears to side with Brennan's concurring opinion in Fraser, saying that Fraser's
speech was not "legally obscene." 108 S. Ct. 562, 567 (1988).
50. 478 U.S. at 698. Contra id. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Tinker was appropriately
applied by the lower courts to find no disruption of the educational process as a result of the
speech). See Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 43, 755 F.2d 1356, 1358-65 (1985).
51. 478 U.S. at 682. ("[T]he first amendment gives a high school student the right to wear
Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket.") (quoting Thomas v. Board of Educ., Granville Cent.
School Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979)).
52. Id. at 683.
53. 108 S. Ct. 562, 571 (1988).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 567-68.
56. Id. at 568.
57. Id.
58. Id. Compare Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
802 (1985) ("The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited
discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.") with
Flowers v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 198-99 (1972) (by allowing public access, commander
of a military base abandoned any claim of special interest in who walks, talks or distributes
leaflets on the avenue of the base).
59. 108 S. Ct. at 569.
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suppression of the students' personal expression. Educators may exercise greater control over school-sponsored publications which are part
of the curriculum and "might reasonably be perceived to bear the
imprimatur of the school. '"6 The Court stated that a school must be
allowed to set high standards for student speech disseminated under
its auspices and may refuse to lend its name and resources to the
dissemination of student expression.61 According to the Court, respon62
sibility for education is better left to school officials than the courts.
Justice Brennan's dissent questioned both the instant Court's designation of the newspaper as a nonpublic forum and the validity of the
public forum doctrine itself.6 While acknowledging that the rights of
school students are not coextensive with the rights of adults, Justice
Brennan asserted that Tinker limits officials' discretion to curtail students' rights.- He criticized the Court for creating a "false taxonomy"
that departs from the material and substantial interference standard
of Tinker if the expression is school-sponsored or might bear the
school's imprimatur.- Justice Brennan distinguished Fraseras a valid
time, place, manner restriction; the school could censor the student's
endorsement for the lewd manner in which it was delivered, not for
its content.6 Because the FraserCourt applied the Tinker test in the
case of a school-sponsored assembly, Justice Brennan reasoned that
the distinction between school-sponsored and casual expression on
school grounds was irrelevant.67 Justice Brennan feared that characterizing expression as school-sponsored would allow school officials to
impose a content restriction without any showing of a compelling government interest or balancing of countervailing considerations.Tinker suggests that students may use school facilities as a public
forum for any expression that does not "materially and substantially
interfere with the educational process or the rights of others."69 In
the instant case, this right of free speech becomes a privilege conditioned upon the state's beneficence. The Court refuses to protect

60. Id.
61. Id. at 570.
62. Id. at 571.
63. Id. at 573.
64. Id. at 574.
65. Id. at 575.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 577.
68. Id. at 580. Even if the school officials were justified in deleting the articles, Justice
Brennan asserted that the means used, deleting the whole page, was overly broad and not
sufficiently tailored to the ends. Id.
69. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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speech in a government-sponsored forum unless the plaintiff establishes that the medium is a traditional7o or designated public forum.71
The instant Court offers no rational basis for distinguishing the personal expression protected in Tinker from the expression in the instant
case. 72 Instead, the Court differentiates the medium of expression in
each case. According to the instant Court, the school in Tinker inhibited lawful, expressive conduct, whereas the school in the instant
case merely refused access to government property. The Court draws
a spurious distinction. By denying access to the one available forum
for expressing student ideas, the school has silenced expression.7
School authorities should not interfere with any student expression
that conforms to the Tinker standard.
By categorizing the school paper as a nonpublic forum, the instant
Court defines the school officials' censorship as an extension of the
state's power to regulate the use of its property. 74 This forum analysis
shifts the focus from the individual's right of expression to the school's
editorial discretion. 75 In Perry, the Court balanced the rival union's
first amendment rights against the government's interest in controlling
the use of its property. In categorizing the mailboxes as nonpublic
fora, the Court considered the historically restricted access to the
fora 76 and the availability of sufficient, alternate fora. 77

70. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (public forum refers to parks, streets and
property that have "immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions").
71. 108 S. Ct. at 569 (Court refuses to apply the Tinker standard until the plaintiff establishes that the school facility is a public forum).
72. Id. Tinker addressed educators' power to prohibit student expression to maintain the
learning environment. The issue in the instant case is the educators' control over school-sponsored
publications that might be perceived as bearing the school's imprimatur. Id. The Tinker analysis
focuses on the disruption to the school and not the medium of expression.
73. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969):
[F]ree speech is not a right that is given only to be so circumscribed that it exists
in principle but not in fact. Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the
right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has provided
as a safe haven for crackpots.
Id.
74. 108 S. Ct. at 571.
75. Id. at 570. The court examines the extent to which educators may edit the contents of
a high school newspaper produced as part of the school's journalism curriculum. The exercise
of editorial discretion is an extension of the state's proprietary right to control the use of the
newspaper. Id.
76. See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
131 (1981) (government may restrict access to mailboxes to material for which postage is paid).
77. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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In the instant case, the Court looked to government's intent to
determine the nature of the forum. Since school officials intended to
control expression in the newspaper, the Court decided that the paper
was a nonpublic forum. 78 The restriction was permissible because the
forum was nonpublic. Through this circular reasoning the Court evades
the central issue: the constitutionality of the restriction. 79 Since the
state opened its property as a medium of expression for some individuals, it should not be allowed to deny access to similarly situated
groups- or prohibit ideas it finds objectionable. 81 The deferential treatment accorded the one union in Perry could be justified by considering
its status as the teachers' representative.82 However, the school paper,
while designated as part of the curriculum,-' is a de facto public forum
to which schools should not deny students equal access.
78. 108 S. Ct. at 568 (school funded the newspaper, principal had reserved editorial discretion, and "[s]chool officials did not deviate in practice from their policy"). The Court's logic leads
to the conclusion that as long as the state intends to censure and indeed does censure, its actions
are not open to challenge.
79. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 813 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (giving a clear, concise critique of the circular reasoning inherent in
the Court's application of the public forum doctrine).
80. See supra notes 14, 15 and accompanying text. Property is not rendered a "public
forum" simply because it is owned by the government, nor is the government required to
surrender its property for use as forum; however, by allowing use of the property as a forum,
it loses its non-forum status. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (having
opened school facilities to student groups, authorities could not deny access to a student religious
group).
81. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) ("The
Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the
public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place."). See also Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (a school is a "public place" and
dedication to specific uses does not imply that the constitutional rights of persons entitled to
be there are to be gauged as if premises were purely private property). Even private property
owners who use their property for public purposes surrender absolute control of their land to
first amendment claims of protected speech. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506
(1946) (company could not prohibit Jehovah's Witnesses from distributing literature in companyowned town because "[o]wnership does not mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for
his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.").
82. The Perry public forum doctrine was further refined in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) ("Control over access to a non-public
forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn
are reasonable in the light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.").
83. 108 S. Ct. 562, 568 (1988) (citing board policy). See Goeking, Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood
School District: Application of the PriorRestraint and the Public Forum Doctrine to the Free
Expression Rights of High School Students, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 889, 904 (1977) ("The
Court has never explicitly used curriculum and non-curriculum distinctions in the public forum
context . .. ").See 478 U.S. 675, 683 (Court implicitly recognized that curriculum ties can be
relevant to resolving first amendment conflicts).
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The Court affirms the school's content-based prior restraint as a
valid exercise of "editorial discretion. '" The FraserCourt affirmed a
content neutral, time, place, and manner restriction consistent with
the Tinker standard.8 The student's endorsement was constitutionally
protected; only the lewd manner of the address was not protected
since it was inappropriate for the school assembly forum. In the instant
case, school authorities denied access to students because the content
the ideas themselves - were objectionable.s 6 The government may
restrict the manner of expression and the class of speakers allowed
access to the school forum.87 The school, however, may not censor
ideas.- Censoring expression that is consistent with the forum's nature89 and purpose- violates both the first amendment and the equal
protection clause.91 Even if the paper is no more than an extension of

84. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
85. 478 U.S. at 689-90 (Brennan, J., concurring) (conduct sufficiently disturbed the educational atmosphere so as to be unprotected under the more exacting standard of Tinker). Cf. id.
at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (school failed to establish that the remarks were disruptive
under the Tinker standard). Both the majority and the dissent agree that the Tinker standard
is applicable. Id. at 683, 690.
86. 108 S. Ct. at 565. The principal objected to the articles because he believed the articles'
references to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for some students.
87. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (discriminating on the basis of the different
status of the two unions is permissible as long as the state does not differentiate on the basis
of their ideas).
88. See, e.g., Board of Educ., Island Trees Free Union School No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 867 (1982) (right to receive information and ideas is inherent corollary of the rights of free
speech and press).
89. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986). The nature of the
forum is defined by its inherent qualities. Id. at 1372. The newspaper lends itself to the exploration of controversial topics of interest to the student body. Id. The school censored the articles
only because of their subject matter - not because the form of expression was inappropriate
for the medium. Id. at 1374-75.
90. See id. at 1372 (The Court of Appeals stated that the newspaper was "intended to be
and operated as a conduit for student viewpoint"); cf. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
108 S. Ct. at 568 (Court held that the censured articles were not within the designated purpose
of the forum, citing Hazelwood Board Policy 348.51 which provides that "[s]chool-sponsored
publications are developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational implications in
regular classroom activities"). The instant Court ignored the rest of the policy statement guaranteeing that "[s]chool sponsored student publications will not restrict free expression or diverse
viewpoints within the rules of responsible journalism." Id. at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. The criterion for granting access to a government forum must at least be rationally
related to the nature and purpose of the forum. The use of any other criterion would be facially
invalid because the first amendment right of expression would be unduly curtailed without a
compelling government interest. Only when the forum is unable to accommodate both expression
and the government function must the right of expression yield. See generally Comment, Forum
Over Substance: Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 35 CATH. U.L. REV.
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the curriculum, the school violated the students' constitutionally protected right of access to information2 The government is not obligated
to provide information, but it may not censor information. 9
The Court has transformed the public forum idea from a rationale
for extending free expression on public property to a mechanism for
restricting the first amendment right at the government's discretion.
What originated as a descriptive formula for balancing the government's and individual's countervailing interests- has evolved into a
prescriptive doctrine, allowing the state to circumvent the first amendment. 95 Rather than balance the state's property interest against the
individual's free speech rights, the Court categorizes the forum according to the government's intended use. 96 Limited public fora are, for

307, 331 (1985) (Court analysis traditionally has focused on the way in which the manner of
expression affects the forum; restrictions on speech or distinctions between speakers were
allowed when the nature of the forum so dictated). See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (An ordinance that required distribution of
literature to be conducted from preassigned booths at a fair was valid even though it inhibited
a religious practice and the right of expression. The peculiar characteristics of the fairgrounds
and the government's interest in controlling large numbers of people dictated this result.); Greer
v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (commander could restrict expression on a military base to preserve
loyalty, discipline, and morale). But see Cornelius v. NAACP, 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985) (government's intent determines the nature of the forum and thus the right to access).
92. See Board of Educ., Island Trees Free Union School No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867.
The school could not remove books from the school library because doing so violated students'
first amendment rights - the right to receive information and ideas is an inherent corollary of
the rights of free speech.
93. Id. at 872. The Court refers to access to books, but the principle is equally valid in
the context of the school paper. See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (educators may not transform students into closed circuit recipients of
only that which the state chooses to communicate).
94. See Comment, supra note 91, at 308 (forum analysis is a "device used to evaluate the
constitutionality of regulating expressive activity on government property by balancing the
mandates of the first amendment against the government's power to restrict the use of its
property to its intended purpose"). Tinker used ambiguous terms to define the extent of students'
first amendment rights to allow a flexible balancing of individual rights and countervailing
government interests. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
95. See Comment, supra note 91, at 332. Deference to the government's intent is inconsistent
with the history of the first amendment because it gives the government almost limitless discretion to restrict speech in facilities not generally open to the public. Id.
96. Farber & Novak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and
Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984):
Constitutional protection should not depend on labeling the speaker's physical location but on the first amendment values and government interests involved in the
case. The public forum doctrine is a useful shorthand method of invoking this
balance of interest. But when the heuristic device becomes the exclusive method
of analysis, only confusion and mistakes can result.
Id. at 1226-30.
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all practical purposes, non-fora unless the government expressly permits unrestricted access. 97 In a nonpublic forum, the right to free
expression will fail if the government can offer any plausible reason
for the restriction. In any other setting, courts would subject a contentbased prior restraint imposed by an administrative agency to the most
9
exacting scrutiny. 8
Access to limited public fora is determined not by the government's
intent but by the degree that access impedes the government's functioning. 99 Courts should presume that government facilities are open
fora and then shift the burden to the state to establish that the expression at issue unduly inhibits a vital governmental function. 1°° This
approach is more consistent with the forum doctrine's historical appli-

97. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 568 (1988) ("school facilities may
be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have 'by policy or by practice' opened
those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by the general public."'). See also supra note 58.
98. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (even in a university, the most
exacting scrutiny is required in cases where the state undertakes to regulate speech on the
basis of its content). See also Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM.

& MARY L. REV. 189, 225 (1983) (because evaluations of content-based restrictions are likely
to involve ideological predispositions of evaluators, the safest and most sensible course may be
to test all content-based restrictions by the same stringent standards of review); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723 (1971) (The Court announced two rules concerning
prior restraints: (1) any system of prior restraint bears a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality, and (2) the government carries the burden to justify any system of prior restraint). The
Supreme Court has not explicitly stated the appropriate level of review for prior restraints in
the school setting. Some lower courts apply the Tinker standard to test prior restraints. See
Eisner v. Samford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 807-08 (2d Cir. 1981) (prior restraint of student
speech is permissible if the official reasonably believes the speech will violate the Tinker standard). But see Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1358 (7th Cir. 1972) (the Tinker
formula is applied to punishment of students; prior restraints are impermissible). The Court of
Appeals in the instant case applied the Tinker standard with the proviso that if censorship is
justified, "the least restrictive means are to be followed." Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist.,
795 F.2d 1368, 1374 n.5 (8th Cir. 1986).
99. E.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
"Consideration of a forum's special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation
since the significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic
nature and function of the particular forum involved." Id. at 650-51. See also Comment, supra
note 91, at 310 (the Court has evaluated restrictions on expressive use of government property
by looking at the particular expressive activity, by examining the way the particular property
is normally used, and by evaluating the effect of that expression on that use).
100. Free expression is such a fundamental right and so essential to political freedom that
the government and its agents must be forced to provide more than a mere rational justification
for curtailing that liberty. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (The first amendment guarantee of free speech is a "fundamental principle of the
American government."). The highly deferential rationality review used by the instant Court
offers no protection against government overreaching.

1988-1989]

CASE COMMENTS

cation, which defined the forum in functional terms rather than according to the government's intent. A presumption of access focuses on
the real issue, not the extent of the government's property interest
but the protection of expression.°1 Schools are inherently fora for the
exchange of ideas,12 and a school newspaper is a medium for exploring
controversial subjects. The state's intent in creating the paper should
be irrelevant.
Students' first amendment rights in school may not be coextensive
with those of adults.03 However, the rights at issue are no less fundamental. What varies is the countervailing state interest. While the
state's interest is more compelling in the school setting, it is still
subject to constitutional restraints.10 The school could have protected
its valid interests in this case by far less intrusive means.10 5 School
officials should be held to a high standard of care when they impinge
upon constitutionally protected rights. 116
Allowing overbroad restraints
fosters careless disregard for first amendment rights17 without promoting any legitimate state interest. While running schools is best

101. Dissenters have criticized the Court's interpretation of the public forum doctrine for
focusing too much on government property interests and ignoring the relevant free speech
rights. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 820
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (examination of the relevant interests [first amendment rights] is
more important than the public forum analysis which is just an analytical device); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 65 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Court's
forum approach to public speech blinds it to the first amendment considerations). See also
Farber & Novak, supra note 96, at 1224 ("Our objection to the public forum analysis is . . .
that it distracts attention from the the first amendment values at stake in a given case.").
102. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The classroom is peculiarly
the 'market place of ideas"').
103. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) ("constitutional rights
of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with those of adults in other
settings").
104. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (state has a right to prescribe the
curriculum for its public schools, though this right is subject to the constraints of the first
amendment); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
105. See 108 S. Ct. 562, 580 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (even if one were to concede
that the school authorities were empowered to delete the two articles, the principal acted
unreasonably in deleting two whole pages containing other unobjectionable articles).
106. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.").
107. See 108 S. Ct. 562, 580 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Such unthinking contempt for
individual rights is intolerable from any state official."); see also H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 148 (1984). The author states that "nonjudicial administrative regulators often
exist for the sole purpose of regulating; this is their raison d'etre. They simultaneously perform
the function of prosecutor and adjudicator and, if only subconsciously, will likely feel obliged to
justify their existence by finding some expression constitutionally subject to regulation." Id.
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left to the school officials, as the Court suggests, the scope of the
first amendment is a legal issue which remains the province of the
courts. 108

The instant case represents the culmination of a disturbing trend
in first amendment law. The Court restricts access to state-sponsored
media, while the state assumes an ever more prominent role in the
"marketplace of ideas."'1 9 The right to free speech is meaningless if
the government can withhold the only effective medium of communication. 11° The public forum doctrine, which extended first amendment
protection to government property, has been transformed into a
mechanism for frustrating free expression.- In deferring to school
authorities, the Court abrogates its duty to protect constitutionally
guaranteed rights. 1 2 First amendment rights may still exist beyond
the schoolhouse gate, but the school "need not tolerate particular
' ' 13
student speech. 1
Amy Fischer
108. See Note, ConstitutionalLaw: Freedom of Speech in the Public Schools - Fraser v.
Bethel School District Revisited, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 472, 480 (1986) (refuting arguments that
judiciary's isolation and incompetence in education makes it unsuited to resolve conflicts in the
school since the issues are legal and constitutional and thus within the court's designated purpose).
109. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (first
amendment protects the "market place of ideas").
110. In Perry, availability of alternate fora weighed heavily in the Court's decision. Restricting access to the mailboxes posed no grave threat to the union's ability to communicate because
there were "substantial alternate channels" open. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 41 (1983). In the instant case, the students, who have no alternate media
with which to communicate with the student body, are effectively denied the right of expression.
111. See 460 U.S. at 46. Individuals may assert a right of free speech only in public fora.
Id. A public forum is created by historical usage or by government acquiescence. Id. The
historical usage category of the public forum and the government acquiescence exception as
defined in Perry and applied in the instant case fail to encompass the broad range of state
facilities that should legitimately be fora for the exchange of ideas. The Court's public forum
analysis violates the equal protection principle by deferring to government intent without
adequately scrutinizing the ends, the means or the fit of means to ends.
112. Since the school's actions abridge a fundamental right, the Court should apply a strict
scrutiny standard of review.
113. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 567 (1988) ("a school need not
tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission'). The "basic
education mission" cited from Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 105 S. Ct. 3159, 3166 (1986), is
never explicitly defined. As schools have near absolute discretion in dictating appropriate curriculum, they wield the power to define the "basic educational mission." Educators may not
"cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom," Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967). However, part of the educational mission is to '"nculcate communal values," 108 S.
Ct. at 570. The Court has deferred to the school officials to draw the fine line between impermissible indoctrination and permissible inculcation.

